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Abstract
A principal challenge in developing any fishery management plan is the allocation of benefits and costs among participants in the
fishery. This process is further complicated by imperfect information about future market demand and limited ability to predict
the consequences of regulatory change. This paper offers a new approach to policymakers, using econometric analysis to simulate the
potential impact of individual tradable quotas (ITQs) in a fishery. We compare the distribution of harvest across participants in the
Atlantic Herring fishery under the current open access regime and under a potential ITQ regime, assuming two different levels of future
demand. Our results show that production efficiency varies by vessel gear, home-port and relationship with buyers. Some of the predicted
consequences of ITQs are: vessels from Massachusetts will gain share relative to those from Maine; trawlers will gain share relative to
purse seine vessels; and independent vessels will lose share relative to vessels that are primarily contracted to specific processors or bait
companies. These results will help policymakers in developing future management plans for the herring fishery. More generally, this
analytical approach can help regulators in any fishery assess the potential impact of alternative policy changes under alternative future
demand scenarios.
r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Effective fisheries management requires a skillful balance
between addressing immediate crises and creating protec-
tive policies using imperfect information about future
conditions. In practice, management efforts in the United
States have typically been reactive because of the difficulty
of designing policies flexible enough to respond to unfore-
seen changes in fisheries. Economists often propose
tradable property rights as a cost-effective management
option that has minimal information requirements. But
despite their theoretical advantages, regulators are often
concerned with the distribution of benefits and costs from
implementation. We address this question by using an
economic model of equilibrium under tradable property
rights to simulate the distributional effects of implementing
tradable property rights in the Atlantic herring fishery
under current and potential future market demand.
Discussions of major changes in regulatory approaches,
such as creating tradable property rights, generally occur in
fisheries in obvious need of change. In contrast, conditions
in the Atlantic herring fishery seem refreshingly benign. By
most standards the fishery has remained consistently
underexploited since the implementation of its fisheries
management plan (FMP) in 2000. Annual harvests over the
past four years have not exceeded aggregate quotas, while a
number of stock assessments have jointly concluded that
the herring biomass has remained stable, if not growing,
over time.1 Compared to the need to address current
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1413 545 5722; fax: +1 413 545 5853.
E-mail addresses: brandt@resecon.umass.edu (S. Brandt), 
dmcevoy@resecon.umass.edu (D. McEvoy).
1While in general scientific assessments indicate that herring biomass as
a whole has been increasing over time, estimates of the amount vary. For a
complete assessment, see Summary of Stock Status in the Proposed
Atlantic Herring Specifications Document (http://www.nefmc.org/
herring/index.html) for the 2005 fishing year.
unsustainable practices in other fisheries, expending
management resources in the Atlantic herring industry
may appear inefficient.
From the fishery stakeholders’ perspective, however, this
is the appropriate time to take action because of demon-
strable excess capacity in the fleet. Proactive fisheries
management is a potential way to avoid the more drastic
measures typically used to remedy problems resulting from
short-sighted regulatory policies. Neighboring fisheries like
the spiny dogfish and the Atlantic wreckfish fisheries,
considered underexploited less than two decades ago, have
been deemed overfished by the regional management
councils and have subsequently witnessed a variety of
emergency closures and restrictions [1,2]. Furthermore, the
current herring stock levels follow a history of large
declines in stocks and fishery closures. The interest in
preemptive action may also reflect the recognition that any
policy change produces a re-distribution of benefits and
costs: as a result, proactive participation in redesigning
management plans is economically rational.
The Atlantic herring management council has proposed
a number of forward-looking management options de-
signed to ensure a sustainable commercial fishery: the most
contested proposals are a variety of limited entry and
tradable fishing permit schemes [3]. This paper contributes
to the ongoing discussion of proactive management in the
Atlantic herring fishery by: (1) estimating the level of
overcapitalization and potential harvest capacity of the
existing boats; and (2) characterizing the long-run distribu-
tional impact of implementing an individual tradable quota
(ITQ) system. First, we estimate a stochastic production
function to arrive at technical efficiency values for each
vessel in the fishery. The fitted model allows us to predict
the level of harvest by increasing effort levels. We are then
able to estimate the most efficient fleet structure needed to
capture any given total allowable catch (TAC). Second, we
characterize the long-run surviving fishing fleet (by gear
type, contract type, home port state and gross registered
tonnage [GRT]) under a functioning ITQ system. We focus
on these characteristics because they are the features that
delineate stakeholders in the debates about the distribu-
tional impact of policy change.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a
brief description of how the fishery is presently regulated
and the direction of future regulation. Section 3 presents
the model and methodology. The following two sections
describe the data set, its sources, and summary statistics,
and then the regression results and technical efficiency
estimates. Section 6 describes the simulation and the final
section provides concluding remarks.
2. Atlantic Herring fishery
2.1. Motivation for regulatory change
The current herring Federal Management Plan (FMP)
consists of caps on annual harvest levels (disaggregated by
management areas) and specific gear restrictions (Herring
FMP 2000). As a result, access to the fishery remains
open, making it susceptible to a flooding of new entrants
and a potential ‘‘derby style’’ race to the total allowable
catch (TAC). Economic models show that in fisheries
with harvest restrictions and without restrictions on
entry, an unbounded number of boats chase a fixed
number of fish, promoting inefficiencies and overcapitali-
zation in the fishery [5,6]. Empirical evidence from existing
ITQ programs suggests that property rights systems
can reduce the level of excess capital employed in the
fishery [7–9]. For a review of the empirical literature,
see [10].
Aggregate harvests under the FMP have averaged
roughly 100,000metric tons (mt) annually, falling about
80,000mt below the fishery-wide TAC. Currently, the
binding constraint on harvests is market demand, but there
are both anecdotal and price data to suggest that these
conditions will change in the near future. Since the mid-
1980s, herring has been predominately sold as lobster bait
to fuel the thriving, and very lucrative, American lobster
fishery [4]. The lobster fishery is the most valuable
commercial fishery on the Atlantic coast of the US and
Canada, with dockside values of American lobster sales
surpassing 300 million dollars at the beginning of the 21st
century. Annual lobster landings between 1980 and 2003
grew at an average annual rate of 3.3% while the annual
value of the total catch (reported landing price) increased
an average of 6.5% annually [11]. Meanwhile, new
developments in information and shipping technologies
have enabled the lobster industry to meet demand beyond
the New England area. The creation of the ‘‘Habitat
Packing Solution,’’ designed to ship live lobsters to
virtually any destination in the world, has allowed many
Maine-based companies to meet West Coast and interna-
tional demand for fresh lobster [12]. Many fishermen and
industry representatives have voiced their concern that they
foresee an increase in overall effort sparked by a positive
shock in market demand.
‘‘This is a concern that I have—that the licenses on this
coast could catch the quotas. The only regulating factor
right now is market [y]. It’s been the markets that have
regulated our participation, but change [in market
demand] is in the wind.’’ Dan Axelsson [13].
Even in the absence of new entrants, the existing herring
fishing fleet has the capacity to significantly surpass TAC
[14].2 The inefficiencies that would be created by the
introduction of currently unutilized capital are a primary
2The Herring Plan Development Team (PDT) included estimates of
harvesting capacity for the existing fishing fleet using data envelopment
analysis (DEA). Although our analysis also estimates potential harvesting
capabilities, we use a parametric approach. Most importantly, this allows
us to calculate efficiency scores for each vessel to characterize the fleet
under ITQ management. In addition, the frontier approach allows us to
test our expectations.
concern among herring fishermen and management, and
the issue is repeatedly raised in policy planning.3
2.2. Debates over distribution of benefits and costs
Recognizing the immediate and potential problems with
the current management plan, the New England Fishery
Management Council and the Atlantic States Marine
Fisheries Commission are working together on the first
amendment to the 2000 FMP. As a starting point, a
number of new objectives have been developed for the
plan, including ‘‘Prevent excess capacity in the harvesting
sector’’ and ‘‘Minimize, to the extent practicable, the race
to fish for Atlantic herring in all management areas’’ [3].
The primary measures proposed in the amendment to
address these problems are: (1) various limited access/entry
schemes, and (2) establishing purse seine/fixed gear only
fishing areas.4
Much of the conflict as to what management measures
are appropriate is due to distributional issues. We identify
three characteristics that distinguish participants in the
fishery: port state, vessel type, and contract type. In each
case, different types of participants have different objec-
tives and therefore different policy preferences.
Massachusetts and Maine are the primary ports for the
herring fishery, and their relative performance under policy
alternatives will likely drive their positions during policy
negotiations.
Fishermen and management have voiced concern about
exacerbating conflicts between vessels in a derby-style race
to fish in the prime inshore harvesting location (manage-
ment area 1A).5 The increasing crowding in the area has
pitted seine vessels, who endorse gear-specific fishing areas,
against trawl vessels. Proponents of gear-specific fishing
areas argue that the growing trawl fleet is able to travel
further distances to fish compared to the purse seine
vessels, which are limited to the inshore areas; without
seine-dedicated areas, they argue, the fleet will be increas-
ingly dominated by trawlers. In addition to gear type,
vessels’ comparative advantages can be distinguished by
their gross registered tonnage. These conflicts between gear
classes over unequal distribution of policy benefits and
costs are evident in other fisheries and have been shown to
affect policy decisions [15–17].
Relationships between fishermen and their buyers are
very important in this fishery, in which vessels leave
port only when they have a confirmed buyer. In recent
years approximately 60% of herring landings have been
sold as lobster bait, with the reminder sold to processors
for the frozen or canned fish markets. Long-run fishery
participants, who have sold primarily to bait-buyers,
argue that historic participation should be a primary
factor for eligibility under limited entry or individual
tradable quotas. Meanwhile, processors with vessels
that became active after the 2000 management plan are
actively lobbying to secure permits for their fleets,
irrespective of tenure in the fleet. The fundamental dispute
is over how to distribute the valuable harvesting quota
and/or permits.
‘‘yI am seeing boats coming over from the West Coast,
and others wanting to get into it, and all of these freezers
that are trying to build up to freeze bait and sell it at a
higher price. I can see what they are doing. We are going
to have to do something about limited entry, and it’s
going to have to happen soon.’’ Dan Fill, a purse seine
captain [13].
3. Model and methodology
To derive vessel-level measures of technical efficiency, we
use federal logbook data on individual landings, input
choices and vessel characteristics to estimate a stochastic
production frontier. Harvest of herring is assumed to be
stochastic because of the nondeterministic effects of
weather, resource stock and environment. For each vessel,
the level of inefficiency is calculated as the mean distance a
fisherman’s production is from the best-practice frontier
[9,18]. This approach operates under the assumption that
the conventional error term e can be expressed as e ¼ v  u,
where v is a purely stochastic term that captures exogenous
shocks while u is the measure of technical inefficiency. The
two-sided error term v is assumed to behave as under the
classical regression assumptions, being distributed nor-
mally with mean zero and a constant variance. The exact
distribution given to the inefficiency component is decided
by the econometrician and usually takes the form of a half-
normal, an exponential, or a truncation of the normal
distribution at 0. The inefficiency term is constrained to be
non-negative to ensure no firm can perform better than the
best-practice frontier [19].
Following similar studies in the literature,6 we specified
the translog functional form shown in Eq. (1) for the
Atlantic herring fishery. The function translates herring
harvest by individual vessels as a function of variable and
fixed input choices according to specific gear type. We use
the translog function because it imposes the fewest
restrictions on input substitution of all available functional
3See revised goals in Amendment 1 (draft) to the Herring Fishery
Management Plan 2005.
4The fishery is divided into four management areas; 1A, 1B, 2, 3, and
the bulk of fishing effort is concentrated in area 1A. The proposed gear
specific fishing area would preserve a portion of the area 1A quota for
seine vessels and is based on the argument that the growing trawl fleet are
able to travel further distances to fish compared to the purse seine vessels
that are restricted to the inshore areas.
5The ‘‘days out’’ regulation, restricting fishing to a five-day week,
included in the ISHMP was first initiated by fishermen (Personal
communication, Mary Beth Tooley 2004). The ASFMC supported the
restriction and recommended to the council to include it in the FMP. The
provision is now included in Amendment 1 to the FMP.
6We followed closely the specification by Squires, Grafton, Alam and
Omar (2003).
forms, and we characterize the inefficiency term with a
half-normal distribution as is typical in the literature7 [20].
ln harvestit
¼ a0 þ a1 ln daysit þ a2 ln grti þ a3 ln crewit
þ a4 ln ageit þ a5 ln days2it þ a6 ln grt2i
þ a7 ln crew2it þ a8 ln age2it
þ a9 ln daysit ln grti þ a10 ln daysit ln crewit
þ a11 ln daysit ln ageit þ a12 ln grti ln crewit
þ a13 ln grti ln ageit þ a14 ln crewit ln ageit
þ a15seine þ a16weir þ a17year2001
þ a18year2002þ a19year2003
þ vit  uit. ð1Þ
Harvest is annual herring harvest for each vessel i in year t;
days is the sum of vessel i’s fishing days in year t and acts as
our measure for variable effort; age is the age of the vessel
in years, which reflects embedded technology; grt is the
gross registered tonnage, used as our measure of capital
stock; crew is the average crew size for vessel i in year t,
used as a measurement for labor input. We expect the signs
on days fishing, gross registered tonnage, and crew size to
have positive effects on harvest, while an increase in the age
of a vessel should have a negative effect. As for the squared
terms, theory suggests we should see a diminishing
marginal productivity of labor, effort and capital. The
differences in gear types are reflected in the two dummy
variables seine and weir used to measure shifts in the
intercept relative to trawl vessels. The three-year dummy
variables are included to capture any time effects relative to
year 2000. These variables may account for a number of
changing conditions, including the size of the resource
stock. A detailed description of the data and its sources is
provided in the next section.
Before calculating vessel-level efficiency terms, a number
of hypotheses concerning the model can be tested. First, we
can test if technical inefficiency exists in the fishery by
setting up the null hypothesis Ho: g ¼ 0, where g ¼
s2u=ðs2v þ s2uÞ which falls between zero and one. If we fail
to reject the null, we should remove the inefficiency
component and revert to estimation using ordinary least
squares. Second, to determine if the translog is appropriate
as opposed to the Cobb–Douglas formation, we set up the
following null and alternative hypotheses: H0:
a5 ¼ a6 ¼    ¼ a14 ¼ 0, Ha: at least one coefficient is
different from zero. The results of these tests are provided
in Section 4.
Individual vessel’s efficiency scores can be derived, as in
Eq. (2) below, by taking the ratio of observed output
conditional on the estimated inefficiency term u to the
estimate of the best-practice frontier (maximum output
with u ¼ 0).
TEit ¼ EðharvestitjuitÞ
Eðharvestitjuit ¼ 0Þ
. (2)
4. Data
The data are the individual trip reports by fishermen
for each fishing day throughout the year, collected by
the National Marine Fisheries Services (NMFS) federal
logbook data set for years 2000–2003. (Logbook data
were not available before 2000 because the Atlantic herring
fishery was not under the jurisdiction of a federal
management plan.) The data include harvest amount,
trip length, crew size, management area and gear used.
The set also contains a number of vessel characteristics
including gross registered tonnage, vessel length, engine
horsepower, owner information, and capacity measures.8
We chose to annualize the trip data in order to dampen
the effects of large, short-term fluctuations in harvest,
thus allowing for a ‘‘smoother’’ production function.
Missing (or questionable) entries were verified and
completed, when available, using the US National Coast
Guard Database. Due to the nature of the reporting
process, a number of other data-cleaning steps needed
to be taken before we could proceed with estimation. These
steps are described in an appendix available from the
authors.
We limited our analysis only to those vessels with gear
used to target herring. Based on conversations with
representatives from the Maine Department of Marine
Resources and the NMFS, we included purse seine, pair
trawl, single trawl, and weir vessels, which together
account for roughly 99% of the total harvest. For the
stochastic production estimation we included dummy
variables for purse seine and weir vessels. These coefficients
therefore can be interpreted as variations in the intercept
compared to the trawl vessels. We decided to combine the
pair trawl and single trawl into a single gear category
because they only vary in scale, not technology. The fishing
practices of weirs and purse seines are, however, very
different from those of the trawlers.9
Vessel ownership within the fishery is important because
it defines what industry groups will potentially gain (or
lose) from policy change. While very few boats in the
herring fishery are legally owned by processors or bait
dealers, there are a number of vessels that are effectively
dedicated to these companies through formal contracts or
informal relationships. The vessels included in our analysis
were divided into one of three contract classes: processor
contracted, bait-company contracted, or independent [21].
7The half normal distribution is the absolute value of a normally
distributed variable.
8We chose vessel weight over vessel length as the measure of capital
stock. Horsepower was highly correlated with both measures so it was
excluded from the analysis. Capacity measures were missing for roughly
half the logbook entries and were therefore not included.
9For a complete description of the three gear types, see http://
www.gma.org/herring.
Processor-contracted vessels exclusively supply herring to
one of the three large processing companies or to the single
remaining sardine cannery. The bait-company-contracted
boats sell their entire catch to a single or very limited set of
bait dealers. The remaining vessels, the independent boats,
are not restricted to selling their catch to single processing
firms or bait dealers. Many of these independent vessels sell
to multiple processors and multiple bait dealers within a
given year. While the dominant contract type is indepen-
dent, multiple large trawl vessels that have recently entered
the fishery are distinguished by their exclusive contracts
with large processors. The recent emergence of these
processor-contracted vessels may be an attempt to capture
a portion of the TAC given the prospect of an ITQ-
managed fishery. We determined the contract type of each
boat by conducting industry interviews and examining the
logbook data.
Finally, it was important to determine which state had
the largest stake in the performance of each vessel [10]. In
all but a few cases, boats were reported to hail from the
same state in which the vessel owner lived and therefore we
used that state as the HPS (home port state). For those
boats with vessel owners living in a state different from the
reported hailing state, we used the state in which the vessel
reported the majority of its landings. The Massachusetts
and Maine fisheries are of primary interest in our study
because these two states produce the majority of the annual
harvest and supply the lucrative lobster fishery with herring
as bait.
Summary statistics are shown in the tables below. There
is large variation in vessel weight and horsepower within
the fleet. Trawlers, on average, are twice as heavy and have
three times the horsepower of purse seine boats. The weir
boats are significantly smaller and less powerful than the
other gear types. Weirs also fished very few days and
averaged only .58mt/day (Table 1).
The Atlantic herring fishery has witnessed several
significant changes in dominant gear type in the past few
decades. In the beginning of the 1980s, fixed-gear vessels
(weirs and stop seines) accounted for roughly two-thirds of
the total harvest. However, since 1984 these gear types have
only contributed an average of around 1000mt annually
Table 1
Summary statistics of the data 2000–2003
Vessel and fishing characteristics Mean Median St. Dev Min Max
All gear types
Gross registered tons 142.80 165 101.26 5 476
Engine horsepower 962.76 850 619.94 150 2985
No. of fishing days per year 96.18 66.50 90.57 1 341
Avg. crew size (including captain) 4.19 4 1.79 1 12.33
Annual harvest (metric tons) 3161.67 1489.71 3889.93 .01 19184.97
Catch per day (metric tons) 22.95 24.39 15.98 .01 72.12
Vessel age 21.07 20 8.31 5 55
Trawl
Gross registered tons 163.67 174 99.09 5 476
Engine horsepower 1117.98 1125 614.52 160 2985
No. of fishing days per year 94.85 58 94.95 1 341
Avg. crew size (including captain) 4.02 4 1.89 1 12.33
Annual harvest (metric tons) 3175.42 1201.82 4145.04 .01 19184.97
Catch per day (metric tons) 23.46 24.22 16.22 .01 72.12
Vessel age 20.40 20 7.07 5 45
Purse seine
Gross registered tons 80.58 66 71.63 5 192
Engine horsepower 452.17 480 112.83 150 580
No. of fishing days per year 121.38 138.50 64.52 2 225
Avg. crew size (including captain) 5.08 5.39 .93 3 6
Annual harvest (metric tons) 3760.86 4281.28 2728.23 .59 8651.32
Catch per day (metric tons) 25.42 27.92 13.08 .29 43.92
Vessel age 23.71 20.50 12.63 6 55
Weir
Gross registered tons 11.60 12 .55 11 12
Engine horsepower 216 250 46.56 165 250
No. of fishing days per year 2.60 2 2.07 1 6
Avg. crew size (including captain) 3.47 4 1.76 1 5
Annual harvest (metric tons) 2.25 .68 3.27 .09 7.94
Catch per day (metric tons) .58 .45 .47 .09 1.32
vessel age 22.20 25 3.83 18 25
Source: NMFS logbook data.
[22]. The purse seine fishery dominated between 1984 and
1997, averaging 76% of total harvest and peaking at 92%
of the total in 1991 [11]. Beginning in the mid-1990s, a
series of trawl vessels has entered the fishery, and trawlers
have captured the largest percentage of the catch. Table 2
shows the current distribution of harvest by each of these
vessel groups.
5. Estimation results
5.1. Parameter estimates and hypothesis tests
The regression results for the stochastic production
model are shown in Table 3. Because we are primarily
interested not on individual parameter estimates but on the
predictive power of the model, we will only briefly discuss
the signs and significance of the coefficients.
The positive signs attached to days fishing, gross-
registered tonnage, and crew coincide with our theoretical
predictions, although only the former two are significant at
the 10% level. An increase in vessel age negatively effects
harvest, but the impact is not significant. The results
indicate a significant diminishing marginal productivity of
labor at the 1% level (crew-squared variable). The effect on
harvest from an increase in boat size and days fishing is
Table 2
Percentage of harvest by gear, HPS, contract type and GRT 2000–2003
Percentage of harvest
Gear type
Purse seine 22%
Single trawl 25%
Pair trawl 53%
Weir .001%
Home port state
MA 33%
ME 44%
NH 6%
NJ 8%
RI 9%
Contract type
Processor contracted 10%
Bait company contracted 14%
Independent 76%
GRT
Low (Q1) 3.00%
Medium (Q2 &Q3) 56.6%
High (Q4) 40.4%
Source: NMFS logbook data.
Note: ‘‘Low’’, ‘‘Medium’’ and ‘‘High’’ gross-registered tonnage refers to
the first quartile, the middle quartiles and the fourth quartile, respectively,
for vessels in the data set.
Table 3
Parameter estimates of the stochastic production frontier
Variables Coefficient Standard error Test statistic p value
lndays 0.935976 0.494452 1.89 0.058
lngrt 1.798043 1.019739 1.76 0.078
lncrew 2.945938 2.122594 1.39 0.165
lnage 0.81987 1.573313 0.52 0.602
lncrewsq 1.30736 0.296509 4.41 0.000
lnagesq 0.014716 0.342605 0.04 0.966
lngrtsq 0.04836 0.090812 0.53 0.594
lndayssq 0.02141 0.033755 0.63 0.526
lngrtlncrew 0.244301 0.289462 0.84 0.399
lngrtlnage 0.16699 0.182243 0.92 0.359
lndayslngrt 0.19798 0.055879 3.54 0.000
lndayslnage 0.35691 0.154581 2.31 0.021
lndayslncrew 0.203763 0.175523 1.16 0.246
lnagelncrew 0.35441 0.753596 0.47 0.638
Weir 0.535526 0.39765 1.35 0.178
Seine 0.379148 0.249499 1.52 0.129
yr2001 0.3106 0.171098 1.82 0.069
yr2002 0.52262 0.157853 3.31 0.001
yr2003 0.28267 0.178977 1.58 0.114
constant 1.432 3.125376 0.46 0.647
/lnsig2v 2.98617 0.964657 3.1 0.002
/lnsig2u 0.27283 0.235846 1.16 0.247
sigma_v 0.224678 0.108369 — —
sigma_u 1.146157 0.135158 — —
sigma2 1.364157 0.274041 — —
Lambda 5.10133 0.229341 — —
Likelihood-ratio test of sigma_u ¼ 0: chibar2(01) ¼ 22.53 Prob4 ¼ chibar2 ¼ 0.000.
Statistically significant at the 10% level.
Statistically significant at the 5% level.
significantly negative at the 1% level. The only other
significant interaction variable is a negative relationship
between harvest and an increase in vessel age and days
fishing. Gear type does not prove to have a significant
effect. The dummy variables for fishing years, which
capture any differences in harvest that are not captured
by the inputs to production, each indicate a decrease in the
intercept compared to the year 2000. Why this relationship
is consistently negative, and strongly significant in 2002,
remains unclear. It is difficult to determine the statistical
significance of individual coefficients due to collinearity of
inputs, but the model as a whole has significant explana-
tory power and is sufficient for the question at hand.
The first test, of whether the translog is the appropriate
functional form, yields an F statistic of 103.90 with a
corresponding p-valueo.000. Therefore, we reject the
null hypothesis that the coefficients on the squared
terms and cross products are all zero and conclude that
the flexible functional form is a better fit than the
Cobb–Douglas.
The second test to determine if technical inefficiencies
exist in the fishery produces a g ¼ :96 with a corresponding
test statistic of 22.53 distributed as a mixed w2 10
(p valueo.001). Thus we reject the null hypothesis that
all variation from the fitted regression is due to random
white noise and proceed using the stochastic production
estimation results. This test provides evidence that vessels
do vary in their level of technical efficiency.
5.2. Technical efficiency scores
Vessel-level technical efficiency scores for each fishing
year were obtained using Eq. (2). The distribution of
efficiency scores by gear, home port, contract type and
GRT are shown in Table 4. The first column, ‘‘mean
efficiency,’’ is the average for that category of vessels. The
columns ‘‘low’’, ‘‘medium’’, and ‘‘high’’ show the number
of vessels in each of the three efficiency classes, where
‘‘high’’ and ‘‘low’’ consist of the fourth and first quartiles
of efficiency scores, respectively, while ‘‘medium’’ consists
of the second and third quartiles. Vessels were similarly
separated into quartiles depending on their gross-registered
tonnage.
On average, purse seine vessels had slightly higher
technical efficiency scores over trawlers, while weirs proved
to be the least efficient gear type. Vessels from New
Hampshire had the highest average efficiency score, which
can be explained in part because the state harbors such few
vessels, one of which is a highly efficient bait-company-
contracted boat. Efficiency is increasing in vessel size; this
may generate policy concern over the equity of tradable
quota programs since the least-efficient, smaller boats may
be forced out of the fishery. In addition, the more recent
processor-contracted vessels are among the least efficient, a
result similar to that found in other studies [16,17].
5.3. Predictive power of the model
Stochastic production estimation allows us to use the
additional information contained in the two-part error
term for more realistic simulations of various policy
alternatives. In the next section we first use our fitted
model to predict the impact on overall harvest of a
demand-induced increase in effort. Then we use the
technical efficiency scores to characterize the fleet structure
in the long and short run under an individual tradable
quota scheme.
In order to proceed with the simulations, we must first
attribute a single inefficiency estimate (uit) to each vessel
(recall that vessels may have between 1 and 4 estimates
depending on how many years they were active in the
fishery). To determine which summary measure is most
appropriate to include in the parameterized model, we use
data from 2000–2002 to predict total harvest for 2003. The
predicted harvests for 2003 using the minimum, mean and
maximum inefficiency estimates from the previous three
years were 89,438, 76,468, and 67,574mt, respectively,
while the actual 2003 harvest was 83,124mt. To avoid
overstating potential harvesting capabilities, we will use the
mean inefficiency estimate in the simulations that follow.
Table 4
Distribution of efficiency scores by gear, HPS and contract type
Mean efficiency High Medium Low Total
Gear type
Purse seine .569 2 5 2 9
Trawl .512 11 22 10 43
Weir .428 0 1 1 2
Total — 13 28 13 54
Home port state
MA .583 5 5 3 13
ME .474 7 11 9 27
NH .615 1 3 0 4
NJ .555 0 4 0 4
RI .492 0 5 1 6
Total — 13 28 13 54
Contract type
Processor contracted .499 0 5 2 7
Bait company contracted .616 2 3 0 5
Independent .510 11 20 11 42
Total — 13 28 13 54
GRT
High (Q4) .571 3 9 1 13
Medium (Q2 & Q3) .526 7 15 6 28
Low (Q1) .451 3 4 6 13
Total — 13 28 13 54
Note: ‘‘Low’’, ‘‘Medium’’ and ‘‘High’’ gross registered tonnage refers to
the first quartile, the middle quartiles and the fourth quartile, respectively,
for vessels in the data set.
10The null hypothesis states that g equals zero, which would be on the
boundary of the parameter space. Therefore, the distribution of the test
statistic for gamma is a mixed w2.
The next section uses the fitted regression model and
technical efficiency measures to guide proactive herring
management in two ways; first we estimate the extent of
existing capacity in the fishery, and second we predict the
distributional impact on the harvest of a tradable property
rights system.
6. Simulations
6.1. Increased effort of current fleet
In this section we demonstrate that pre-emptive regula-
tion is rational, given the potential for a ‘‘race for fish’’.
Changes in demand for herring are tied to changes in the
downstream lobster bait, frozen fillet, and canned fish
markets; we proceed under the reasonable assumption that
increased demand will cause an increase in overall fishing
effort. In this section we use conservative estimates of
vessels’ maximum effort levels to predict the resulting
aggregate harvest.
By varying each vessel’s number of days fishing in our
model, we can predict the impact of an increase (or
decrease) in fishing effort. In this particular fishery, it is
entirely reasonable to assume that many boats are not
fishing at full capacity.11 However, it is not likely that all
boats have the same technical constraint on the maximum
level of effort (days at sea) they can fish. We divided the 54
boats into four size classes depending on their gross
registered tonnage. Following the advice of industry
experts,12 we assumed the boats in the smallest size class
were already fishing at maximum capacity due to technical
constraints. The remaining vessels were assumed to fish the
number of days equal to the most active fisher in their size
class. Therefore, our estimate of maximum harvest
potential is conservative because it does not allow the
smallest quintile of boats to increase their effort levels, nor
does it allow current vessels to expand their capacity.
The predicted harvest from maximum effort given these
assumptions (Table 5) can be compared to the TAC for the
2005 fishing year (Table 6) for a measure of excess capacity
beyond what is allowed by the annual quota.
Although we cannot determine the exact allocation of
harvest between each area, it is obvious that the existing
fleet has the potential to far exceed the 180,000mt TAC by
simply matching the effort level of the most active fisher in
each vessel’s respective size class. The guiding policy
implication is that even in the absence of new entrants,
there is a significant level of overcapitalization, and
therefore inefficiency, in the fishery.
We can say a little more about how the increased effort
level may affect individual fishing areas. Since harvest
levels in area 1A are most likely to reach the respective
total allowable catch, special attention must be given to
this area. In the 4 years considered in this analysis, landings
in area 1A have averaged 55.75% of the total annual
landings. In the same time period, purse seine landings
have accounted for roughly 30% of the total catch taken
from area 1A [3]. Because the purse seine vessels are
typically restricted to fishing exclusively in this area, an
increase in effort level as above would dramatically
increase the inefficiencies resulting from the race to fish
already occurring here. These pressures are likely to
exacerbate existing tension between participant groups
and regional interests.
The motivation to amend the existing herring FMP was
largely due to many subjective (and a few objective) claims
of excess capacity in the industry.13 The menu of
alternative limited entry plans, as well as the purse seine/
fixed gear-only fishing areas proposed by the council and
advisory committees, were developed in part because
many of the existing stakeholders foresaw potential
problems due to existing overcapitalization and the threat
of new entrants.14 In the words of Al West from Stinson
Seafood [13],
‘‘Limited access—we firmly believe that this has to
happen. There is enough capacity in the fleet right now
to take all of the quotas in all of the areas if the fish were
there. There is no question in my mind that there is
plenty of capacity.’’
The objective of limited entry schemes is to cap or reduce
the amount of capital in the fishery. These programs,
however, do not limit the level, intensity, or concentration
Table 5
Share of predicted harvest by gear type—maximum effort
Gear type Predicted harvest
Trawl 264,384
Purse seine 63,019
Weir 7.14
327,410
Table 6
TACs for the 2005 fishing year
Area 1A Area 1B Area 2 Area 3 U.S. Total NB Fishery Total
60,000 10,000 50,000 60,000 180,000 20,000 200,000
Source: Revised FMP specifications 2005.
11Personal communication with Kohl Kanwit; Drew Kitts; Marybeth
Tooley; and Lori Steele.
12Much of our technical advice came from Drew Kitz, Kohl Kanwit,
and interviews of fishermen.
13The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) includes estimates of
capacity measures for individual vessels using data envelopment analysis
(DEA). By sorting their 51 vessels into gear categories, they determined
average vessel capacity and average trips taken per quarter for each gear
type to arrive at an aggregate harvest estimate (current effort) of
180,100mt. This analysis, however, does not allow for predictions using
technical efficiency measures.
14See NEFMC July 13th, 2004 meeting minutes discussing Amendment
1 to the herring FMP.
of effort individual fishers may exert in the fishing year.
Therefore, limited entry programs are unsuccessful at
preventing derby fishing, because the remaining vessels
are competing against each other to capture the largest
share of the given quota [23]. An increasingly important
alternative is a system of individual quotas, which can be
traded across participants.
6.2. Individual tradable quotas (ITQs)
By issuing defined property rights, ITQs should result in
an increase in economic efficiency [7–9,24]. These gains, at
least in theory, are realized for two reasons. First, relatively
inefficient vessels will find it more profitable to sell their
entire quota and leave the industry as opposed to
continuing fishing. Meanwhile, the remaining fishermen
can buy or sell quota until each equates its marginal benefit
from fishing to the market permit price. Under the
assumptions of complete information, perfect competition,
and zero transactions costs and the additional assumption
that the distribution of quotas does not affect the marginal
valuation of the resource, the resulting distribution of
fishing effort will be efficient [9].
Increased efficiency can be caused by reducing technical,
allocative, or scale inefficiencies. Allocative inefficiency
describes a choice of inputs that does not minimize the cost
of producing a given output, while scale inefficiency
describes an inappropriate choice of output for a given
technology [9]. Due to a lack of cost data, our analysis
focuses on management impacts on technical inefficiencies.
We proceed under the assumption that the most technically
efficient boats will also be the most cost effective—an
assumption in keeping with the previous economic
literature evaluating gains from ITQs [8,25]. For our study,
this assumption is reasonable because we consider capital
to be fixed in the short run, while vessels are choosing a
single variable input (days fishing).15
We can now use our technical efficiency estimates to
predict which vessels will remain in the fishery under a fully
functioning ITQ system. To proceed, we abstract from the
many details involved in designing and implementing an
ITQ regime and only focus on long-run capital restructur-
ing. For simplicity, we can assume that individual quotas
are grandfathered to all licensed vessel owners free of
charge as is typically the case in the US [10]. In addition we
will consider the aggregate TAC to be fixed at 180,000mt
annually.
We examine two scenarios. First determine the most
efficient fleet structure needed to harvest the current annual
market demand of roughly 100,000mt. Second, we find the
most efficient fleet structure needed to harvest the total
allowable catch of 180,000mt. We can then analyze the
predicted distributional impact of the ITQ plan on gear
class, contract type, home port state, and vessel size. These
variables are particularly important because they identify
the primary stakeholders in the Atlantic herring fishery.
Essentially, we are determining which industry groups will
win or lose given a particular policy decision.
A graph of harvest as a function of fleet size (assuming
maximum effort) is shown below in Fig. 1.
The graph shows the cumulative harvest levels (y-axis)
given various fleet sizes, where the fleet is ordered from the
most to the least technically efficient vessels (x-axis). If the
economic predictions are realized, less efficient vessels will
choose to sell their share of the quota to more efficient
fishers, rather than to continue harvesting. Therefore, in
the long run, the ITQ system selects the most efficient
vessels to remain in the fishery. The graph is useful for
determining the long-run fleet size needed to harvest a
given level of catch.16
The lower arrow suggests that while 54 boats have been
active (at least minimally) in the previous four years, a fleet
less than 1/3 of that size could harvest the same amount at
a more efficient level. Although the assumptions required
to achieve maximum efficiency under an ITQ system are
restrictive, we can expect to see a substantial exit of capital
from the industry in the long run. The second arrow
indicates that only the 23 most efficient vessels are needed
to harvest the TAC. This point represents the fleet structure
that would result were market demand to increase to
consume the entire TAC.17
Table 7 shows the predicted distributional impact of an
ITQ regime given current and increased market demand
for herring.
Given the current total harvest, an ITQ system would
produce further domination by single and pair-trawl
vessels compared to purse seine vessels. Independent
vessels continue to account for the majority of the harvest,
but lose a significant share of the total as demand increases.
Processor contracted vessels, the least efficient in terms of
contract type, are forced out of the fishery under the
existing demand simulation, but account for over 20% of
the catch given increased demand. Bait-company-con-
tracted boats gain a significant share of the harvest relative
to the status quo under current demand but do not increase
their existing share if there is an increase in demand. A
significant shift in the harvest from Maine to Massachu-
setts would result from the introduction of property rights,
15Logbook data indicate that vessels rarely vary the number of crew per
fishing trip, and therefore we fix the crew level at its average level.
16Note: The flatter portions of the cumulative harvest graph indicate
smaller boats fishing a relatively limited number of days. Specifically, the
1st, 3rd, and 8th most efficient vessels are in the smallest size class and
therefore our analysis assumes they are unable to increase their current
effort levels (1, 4 and 80 fishing days respectively). The flat portion of the
graph located between the 4 and 5 vessel indicates only a slight increase in
cumulative harvest caused by the 5 most efficient boats. This vessel is in
the second smallest size class (32 GRT) and employs only a single crew
member and therefore its contribution is relatively small.
17It is likely that the few, very efficient smaller boats that fish a limited
number of days are not significant players in the herring fishery. However,
because those vessels are not capturing large shares of harvest, their
presence has little impact on the shares of harvest for the remaining
vessels.
and could have serious impacts on both states’ lobster
industries.
The processors who have established exclusive contracts
with vessels will most likely support a tradable permit
system only in the event of an increase in demand. Under
the current market conditions, their relatively inefficient
vessels will be unable to remain in the fishery. The bait-
contracted boats, on the other hand, do not suffer
significant losses under either scenario but capture a much
larger percentage if demand stays at its current level. We
should therefore expect the bait dealers with dedicated
boats to favor an ITQ system in the absence of a change in
the market.
We do not see a dramatic change in harvest percentage
by vessel weight in either scenario. The relatively efficient
large boats see a small increase given a positive shock in
demand while the medium boats capture just slightly less.
However, it is important to note that purse seine fishermen
tend to use smaller boats and are restricted to the inshore
area. Although they are the most efficient gear type, they
are also likely to have already reached their technical
constraint on harvest capacity. Therefore, an increase in
demand in conjunction with individual quotas will
necessarily reduce the purse seine harvest percentage.
These simulations paint a quantitative picture of the
likely impact of ITQs in the Atlantic herring fishery.
Although that impact will depend in part on the total
catch as determined by market demand, policymakers
can make detailed predictions of how policy change will
affect the distribution of the catch across different
stakeholders in the fishery. If demand grows, the total
allowable catch will eventually determine the number of
vessels that can remain in the fishery as well as the
distribution of benefits.
7. Conclusion
Individual tradable quotas are an increasingly important
policy option for fisheries management. While a handful of
papers have explored the impact of implementing an ITQ
program ex post, this study uses an objective econometric
approach to predict how individual property rights would
change the composition of the fishing fleet and the
distribution of the harvest over that fleet. These results
will help the management of the Atlantic herring fishery
forecast the long-term distributional and efficiency impact
of a property rights regime; in addition, this approach
could be used to simulate the effect of policy change in
other fisheries, giving policymakers a valuable analytical
tool.
It is important to emphasize the objective nature of this
study. These simulations are useful in predicting who wins
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Fig. 1. Predicted harvest given most efficient fleet size.
and who loses from an ITQ regime, but they do not
consider the important equity concerns that surround this
issue. Our finding that the purse seine fleet will continue to
lose a substantial percentage of the total annual harvest
under ITQs should be considered in evaluating policy
options including alternatives to ITQs.
This study also confirms what fishermen and industry
stakeholders have been claiming for years: there is
substantial overcapitalization in the Atlantic herring fish-
ery. A fleet roughly one-third its current size could harvest
the current demand for herring at a much more efficient
level, and only 23 vessels are necessary to harvest the total
allowable catch. Right now, fishing effort is primarily
regulated by the market (demand for herring), but the
capacity is in place to accommodate a large increase in the
demand for herring. To reiterate Dan Axelsson’s statement
during a 2003 scoping meeting, ‘‘It’s been the markets that
have regulated our participation, but change is in the
wind.’’ Demand pressure from the American lobster fishery
and the various domestic and international export markets
could produce significant increases in fishing effort, leading
to increased inefficiency and potential overfishing. For
these reasons, addressing the excess capacity problem is of
tantamount importance in achieving a sustainable com-
mercial herring fishery.
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